Pierre Le Morvan, Professor
Ph.D. Syracuse University
Some areas of special interest: epistemology, philosophy of perception, philosophy of religion, philosophy of science.
Teaches (besides the basic core courses): courses in the above areas, ethics, aesthetics.
Pierre Le Morvan
Ph.D. Syracuse University
Some areas of special interest: epistemology, philosophy of perception, philosophy of religion, philosophy of science.
Teaches (besides the basic core courses): courses in the above areas, ethics, aesthetics.
Research: “When Ignorance Excuses” (forthcoming a) at Ratio: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy; “Propositional Learning: From Ignorance to Knowledge (forthcoming b) in Episteme: A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology; “Knowledge Before Gettier” (2017) in the British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25(6): 1-23; “Knowledge and Security” (2016) in Philosophy 91(3): 411-430; “On the Ignorance, Knowledge, and Nature of Propositions” (2015) Synthese 192(11): 3647-3662; “Privacy, Secrecy, Fact, and Falsehood” (2015) The Journal of Philosophical Research 40: 313-336; “Why the Standard View of Ignorance Prevails” (2013) Philosophia 41(1): 239-256.; “On Ignorance: A Vindication of the Standard View” (2012) Philosophia 40(2): 379-393;“Skepticism and Practical Wisdom” (2011) Logos & Episteme II, 1: 87-102; “On Ignorance: A Reply to Peels” (2011) Philosophia 39(2): 335-344; ; “Knowledge, Ignorance, and True Belief” (2010) Theoria 76:309-318; “Selfishness, Altruism, and our Future Selves” (2009) The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87(3): 409-424; “Sensory Experience and Intentionalism” (2008) Philosophy Compass 3: 1-18; “Epistemic Means and Ends: A Reply to Hofmann” (online 2007, print 2008) Synthese: An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science 162:252-264; “Is Clouser’s Definition of Religious Belief Itself Religiously Neutral?” (2006) Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 58(1): 16-17; “A Metaphilosophical Dilemma for Epistemic Externalism” (2005), Metaphilosophy 36(5): 688-707; “Medical Learning Curves and the Kantian Ideal” (co-authored with Barbara Stock) (2005) The Journal of Medical Ethics 31: 513-518; “Intentionality: Transparent, Translucent, and Opaque” (2005) The Journal of Philosophical Research 30: 283-302; “Goldman on Knowledge as True Belief” (2005) Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy62(2): 145-155; “Ramsey on Truth and Truth on Ramsey” (2004) The British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12(4), 705-718; “Arguments Against Direct Realism and How to Counter Them” (2004) The American Philosophical Quarterly 41(3), 221-234; “Plantinga on Warranted Christian Belief” (co-authored with Dana Radcliffe) (2003) The Heythrop Journal: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy and Theology 44(3), 345-354; “Is Mere True Belief Knowledge?” (2002) Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy 56(2), 151-168. “The Converse Consequence Condition and Hempelian Qualitative Confirmation,” (1999) Philosophy of Science 66(3), 448-455.
Also at TCNJ: Department Chair (2018-present; 2015-2016); Coordinator of Religious Studies (2005-present); Religious Studies Adviser (2003-present); Coordinator of the Liberal Learning Concentration in Religious Studies (2005-present); Departmental Webmaster and IT Liaison (2003-2017); Member, School of Culture and Society Curriculum Committee (2001-2011) and Chair of the committee (2010-2011); Charter member, TCNJ’s Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (2005-present); Member, Academic Dismissals Committee (2001-2005); Member, All-College Disciplinary Board (2001-2006); Adviser to the Philosophical Society (2000-2003).
Other: Interested in French and Indian vegetarian cuisine, the welfare of non-human animals, Canadian history; loves the New York Review of Books; has served as referee for the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Acta Analytica, Dialectica, Dialogue, Erkenntnis, Synthese, The Journal of Medical Ethics, and Theory & Psychology.
Currently working on: Papers on ignorance and knowledge, philosophy of perception; book defending the Theory of Appearing.